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Abstract:  
 The aim of this thesis is to investigate and examine Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition 
of Japanese nationalism from minzokushugi to kokuminshugi, and to place this redefinition 
within Japan’s larger historical inclusion/exclusion discourse through the redefining of Japan’s 
‘Japaneseness’.  
 The first part of this thesis explains the theoretical framework in which this thesis 
investigates its research aim. This framework is composed of Foucault’s governmentality, 
Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’, the IR theory of Constructivism and Takeo 
David Hymans’ theory of the ‘Politics of Memory’. The purpose of this theoretical framework 
is to breakdown the distorted and contested memories that are used to shift the boundaries of 
Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’. This framework is furthered by examining the various theories of the 
Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation theory, and National Polity theory and how they 
were used within Japan to (re)define the concept of Japaneseness.  
 In the second part, this thesis examines how this constantly shifting concept of 
Japaneseness was used to assimilate different minzoku into the Japanese empire. This is initially 
done by examining how the Ainu and Okinawans were made a part of the Japanese 
consciousness and how this was achieved through the use of distorted memories. The breaking 
down of Japan’s distorted narratives is further progressed by examining Japan’s contemporary 
form of ‘memory politics’ through examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japan’s 
nationalism. This thesis argues that while Shinzo Abe’s redefinition towards kokuminshugi can 
be seen as an attempt to move ‘towards a beautiful country’, it should instead be seen as Abe’s 
attempt to escape the colonial and post-war narratives that still plague Japanese nationalism 
today.  
 In conclusion, this thesis argues that Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japanese 
nationalism is not a new phenomenon but instead apart of a larger historical trend within Japan. 
This trend consists of the boundaries of Japan’s Japaneseness being (re)shifted in order to 
accommodate Japan’s political aims and agendas of the time. Consequently, the constant 
redefinition of Japan’s Japaneseness creates the situation where the existences of these 
minorities (Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, etc.) become distorted in the imagined history 
of the Japanese nation-state and are blurred into a singular ethnography.    
	 2	
Table of Contents 
Abstract: ................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3 
1.2 Methodology: .............................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 2: Literature review .................................................................................................. 7 
2.1 The tools of distortion ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.2 ‘The Politics of Memory’ ........................................................................................................... 9 
2.3 Japan’s memory politics .......................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 3: The building of a nation ..................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 4: Building on a Legacy .......................................................................................... 24 
4.1 Zainichi Korean ........................................................................................................................ 25 
4.2 A contest history of nationalism .............................................................................................. 29 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 32 
Bibliography: .......................................................................................................................... 35 
 
	
 
 	
	 3	
Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
 On the eve of Shinzo Abe’s premiership in 2006, Abe released his book ‘Utsukushii 
kuni e’ or ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’, wherein he not only introduced Japan to himself as 
a person but he also introduced Japan to his political ambitions and set the tone of both his 
2006 and later 2013 - present premierships. While ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ outlined 
Abe’s thoughts on defense, the economy, and Japan’s aging population, it is Abe’s ideas on 
Japanese nationalism that are particularly striking.  
In order to move ‘towards a beautiful country’, Abe proposed that Japan should redefine 
Japan’s nationalism in a bid to become more inclusive (Abe 90). The reason that this new 
definition is so striking is that prior to this, the manner in which an individual was determined 
to be included as a member of the Japanese nation-state was through ethnic or blood ties. This 
form of nationalism or ‘minzokushugi’ places the focus on individuals being of the same 
ethnicity/ ‘minzoku’, but can be more closely translated to the German word ‘volk’ (Morris-
Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 80). This new form of nationalism that Abe 
proposed called ‘kokuminshugi’, where kokumin means nation or citizen, places an emphasis 
on the relationship between the state and the national. Thus, kokuminshugi or civic nationalism 
‘locates the people as those who give allegiance to the flag and anthem of their country, not 
those who share the same blood or descent’ (K. M. Doak 271). It is the last half of this quote 
that proves to be the crux of the shift in Abe’s new nationalism, namely a shift away from 
association by blood and towards association through the state.  
 This move away from ethnic relations and towards an association through the nation-
state presents the possibility of allowing the integration of new people into the nation-state; 
such a development could present an answer to Japan’s issue of a decreasing population 
coupled with its low fertility rate (shoushikoureika). However, it also allows for the further 
integration of disparaged minorities such as Ainu or Zainichi Koreans by focusing less on 
ethnic ties and more on a national identity.  
 It is this ethnic nationalism that has hitherto dominated Japan’s understanding of what 
it means to be ‘Japanese’ and how the state determined who is and is not included as a member 
of the nation-state. However, when the use of the terms civic versus ethnic nationalism within 
Japan is further investigated, Shinzo Abe’s pragmatic understanding of who is Japanese and 
who is included in the nation-state is not uniquely a part of Shinzo Abe’s political views.  
 Eiji Oguma in his work ‘A genealogy of “Japanese” self-image’ historicizes the 
changing understanding of what it meant to be Japanese after the opening of Japan by Matthew 
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Perry in 1853. In addition, Oguma outlines the various theories and narratives that would be 
used to include or exclude individuals from being part of the Japanese population. Oguma 
called this complex, fluid and ever-changing understanding of what it meant to be Japanese 
‘Japaneseness’. This concept of Japaneseness has been in a state of constant evolution based 
on the theory that is relevant at the time, be it the Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation 
theory, or the National Polity theory. However, what is striking about this concept of 
Japaneseness and the various theories that have influenced it, is that there always seemed to be 
a political motive behind the transition from one theory to another and thus also a political 
motive behind the changing of Japaneseness’ understanding. The political aims behind these 
shifts, be they the resistance against western domination or the imperial aspiration, shifted the 
concept of Japaneseness and the very boundaries of the Japanese nation-state.  
 Therefore, when Abe’s proposed definition shift from minzokushugi to kokuminshugi 
is viewed through the concept of Japaneseness, it seems that this proposed redefinition is yet 
another step in the ever-shifting inclusion/exclusion narrative within Japan. However, while 
Abe’s understanding of kokumin on the surface appears more inclusive, has sparked a debate 
about whether one’s relations to the state and the flag should be the only qualifications to being 
a kokumin. With minority groups such as the Ainu and the Zainichi Koreans who were born 
and raised within Japan falling outside this new understanding of kokumin, this shift towards 
kokuminshugi raises questions over why Abe would propose such a shift and brings into 
question the understanding of what a kokumin is.  
Thus, this thesis shall investigate the complex and ever-changing concept of 
Japaneseness and how the genealogy of the use of the concept Japaneseness can help break 
down the reasons why Abe would propose a shift to kokuminshugi and the complications that 
arise from its proposal. In order to do so this thesis shall address the research question “How 
does examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift towards kokuminshugi through the concept of 
‘Japaneseness’ affect the continued influence of memory politics on the inclusion/exclusion 
debate within Japan?” 
While it is possible that a Japanese version of this type of research has already been 
conducted, there is not to my knowledge such a type of work done within the English academic 
community. Therefore, this thesis’ aim is to place Shinzo Abe’s redefinition of Japanese 
nationalism within a historiographical understanding of the evolution of the concept 
Japaneseness, it secondly looks to open up this discussion the English-speaking community in 
an effort to broaden the debate.  
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1.2 Methodology:  
  
The methodology that will be used to investigate the proposed research question will 
be centered around analyzing the third chapter of Shinzo Abe’s book ‘utsukushii kuni e’. 
Within this chapter, Abe outlines his thoughts on nationalism and what is important about his 
proposed shift in how nationalism is defined. Takeo David Hymans’ concept of ‘the politics of 
memory’ and Foucault’s concept of governmentality will make up an important part of my 
theoretical framework. Foucault’s concept of governmentality helps understand how 
‘governments try to produce the citizen best suited to fulfill their policies’ (Mayhew, 
oxfordreference.com). This concept of governmentality helps to explain why there was so 
much debate amongst Homogenous Nation scholars such as Inoue Tetsujiro, Hozumi Yatsuka 
and Kato Hiroyuki and Mixed Nation theorists such as Taguchi Ukichi, because it raised 
questions of how far Japan could justify its imperialist actions and how far its governmentality 
could go (Oguma 90).  
This theoretical framework shall be further developed through Hymans’ concept of 
‘politics of memory’. This theory is the application of Thomas Hobbes concept of gain, safety 
and reputation but applied to an East Asian political context (IIAS 3). This theory states that 
the memories of a nation-state can and will be changed for the purposes of ‘gain’, ‘safety’ or 
‘reputation’ (IIAS 3). Hymans’ use of ‘Gain’ refers to how nation-states increase their power, 
be it soft or hard, relative to their regional competitors by distorting their memories in a manner 
that is beneficial towards their agendas (IIAS 3).  
I shall build upon the theoretical framework by examining how the International 
Relation theory (IR theory) of constructivism and Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘Imagined 
Communities’ will help break down the distortion of memories used to change how 
Japaneseness has been defined. This constructivist theory proposes that national identities are 
based upon the social, historical, political and economic context in which that nation is set in 
(176, Hopf). This theory shall be combined with Anderson’s notion that nations are socially 
constructed communities that are defined by the individuals who perceive themselves to be 
member of these specific communities (6, Imagined communities).  These two theories shall 
assist in analyzing the nation building process from both a political and social perspective. 
Ultimately this will assist in tackling this multiple layered question and build a strong 
foundation for further investigation.  
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 The key primary source for this thesis is Shinzo Abe’s ‘Utsukushii kuni e’. The rest of 
this thesis shall be based on secondary sources. While the theoretical background sources have 
already been outlined and defined, the key secondary sources that shall be used in this thesis 
will include Eiji Oguma’s ‘A genealogy of Japanese self-images’, Eiji Oguma’s ‘The 
Boundaries of ‘the Japanese’: Vol. 1: Okinawa, 1818–1972: Inclusion and Exclusion’, Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki’s ‘Reinventing Japan’ and Kevin M. Doaks ‘A history of nationalism in modern 
Japan’.  
The importance of understanding the differences between the Homogenous Nation 
theory, the National Polity theory and the Mixed Nation theory and why Japan shifted between 
these theories to justify its imperialist ambitions is crucial as it illustrates the dominance that 
race and the defining of races played in the building of the Japanese nation. Once that 
understanding is built, then it is important to analyse why Shinzo Abe had endorsed 
kokuminshugi.  
 While this thesis is investigating how the term nationalism has been dealt with within 
Japanese academia, it is important to note that due to the scope of this thesis definitions such 
as kokkashugi1 will not be discussed. Thus, this thesis is only examining the use of the terms 
‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism within Japan’s identity discourse. The rationale for reducing 
these different theories into either the ethnic or civic variant is because when theories such the 
Homogenous Nation theory, National Polity theory, Mixed Nation theory, etc. are considered; 
they all place a large emphasis on the ethnic differences (or lack of) to justify the inclusion or 
exclusion of a group of people. In contrast, Abe’s proposed kokuminshugi hyper-corrects itself 
to have a civic form of nationalism. Thus, to focus and provide an easily digestible contrast, I 
have settled upon using ethnic and civic nationalism.  
However, while this thesis does acknowledge that this phenomenon is far from a simple 
‘black or white’/ethnic or civic contrast, this thesis will still aim to highlight the issues 
presented when memory politics are used to reduce such a complicated concept as nationalism 
down to two contrasting variants. While this study is nowhere near long enough to discuss 
nationalism within Japan in its entirety, it does hope to add to the study of ‘Japaneseness’ by 
investigating its more contemporary form and provide a proper springboard for further research 
into how Japaneseness is contemporarily defined.  
  
                                                
1	Statism or state nationalism		
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Chapter 2: Literature review   
 
	2.1 The Tools of Distortion 
This chapter shall initially construct a general theoretical understanding of memory politics 
and the discourse and processes that go into this identity building process. It then develops this 
further by describing Japan’s inclusion/exclusion debate that took place during the Meiji era 
(1868-1912) that spawned the creation of the Homogenous Nation theory, and forced national 
polity theorists to incorporate Mixed Nation theory concepts in order to stay relevant.  
 When addressing the use of hierarchical power over a group of people for the means of 
control or political aims, an important concept that needs to be first understood is Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. While the concept of governmentality, much like many 
of Foucault’s concepts have been used and adopted in different academic fields and taken on 
different meanings, this work shall use the definition given by Foucault in ‘The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality’. In this recorded lecture, Foucault defines governmentality 
as ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures analyses and reflection, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which 
has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its 
essential technical means apparatuses of security” (102).  
 While Foucault’s lectures tended to focus on governmentality within 16th century 
Europe, the general questions and themes that Foucault addresses in this work can be applied 
in a more universal setting. One of the most important questions that Foucault addresses is 
“‘what is governance’ and what is ‘good’ governance’” (87). Thus, when addressing 
governmentality and how the logic of governmentality is seen in ‘good’ governance, it is 
important to ask ‘how does one govern oneself, how is one governed, how does one govern 
others, by whom will the people accept being governed, and how does one become the best 
possible governor?’ (87). The latter questions present an interesting dichotomy where the 
relationship between the governed and the governor and the manner in which we define this 
relationship can heavily influence whether a situation has good or bad governance. Foucault 
explains this dependent view on governance through Guillaume de La Perriere’s ‘Miroir 
Politique’ (1567) where Perriere describes how the vocabulary we use to define a relationship 
impacts said relationship.   
 La Perriere explains that governor and governed can be used for a multitude of different 
relationships, from an emperor and his subjects, a monarch and his kingdom, a lord and his 
county, a judge and the prisoners that are being judged, a parent and his/her child(ren), etc. 
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(Foucault, Governmentality 91). Therefore, simple vocabulary changes such as monarch and 
parent portray entirely different expectations on what type of governance would be needed and 
what would constitute good governance in this different relationship (91).  
 While the previous description explains the relationship between the definition of 
governance and the governed, La Pierrere’s concept does not explain its relationship to 
governmentality nor the previously given definition. If Foucault’s definition is broken down, 
the section ‘that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ gives 
an important defining characteristic of what governmentality is, namely the various 
mechanisms, ideals and techniques used in the production of citizens (Mayhew). Foucault goes 
on to describe how this process takes place by stating ‘the means that the government uses to 
attain these ends are themselves all in some sense immanent to the population, it is the 
population itself on which the government will act either directly through target scale 
campaigns or indirectly through these techniques’ (Foucault, Governmentality 100). Thus, 
through governmentality, governments gain the ability to enhance, (re)define, and enforce 
certain narratives, perspectives, and/ or characteristics that facilitate in the production of 
citizens. However, while governmentality is the means in which governments can produce 
citizens, it still does not explain why nation-states would engage in this act. 
 Two important pieces of literature that can help show why actors participate in this 
process are Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ and the IR theory of 
‘constructivism’. Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking work ‘Imagined Communities’ reveals 
that nations are not primordial or destined entities but rather that nations are socially 
constructed communities where the individuals who perceive themselves as members of these 
communities are the creators of them (Anderson 6). This means that the social constructions 
that define these communities can be changed as the community changes.  
However, this theory, with its heavy focus on the social construct of a nation, only 
explains part of the fluid nature of the term Japaneseness as this phenomenon is not just a 
matter of social construction. Therefore, while Anderson’s theory is important to note, the IR 
theory of constructivism provides the proper breadth needed to fully understand this 
phenomenon.  
The IR theory of constructivism and Anderson’s theory of ‘Imagined Communities’ 
follow very similar logic in that they realized the importance of social construction in the 
creation of a ‘people’. However, constructivism also proposes that nations and national 
identities are entities that are socially, historically, economically and politically constructed 
(Hopf 176). Therefore, unlike the neorealist approach, constructivism does not assume that an 
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actor’s identity is at its core a self-interested state, but instead changes across time and space 
(Hopf 176). This understanding of nation building and the identity building process presented 
by constructivism is better suited than theories such as neo-realism and/or Anderson’s 
‘Imagined Communities’ to breaking down the fluid nature of Japan’s Japaneseness, as it 
understands the ever-changing state of an actor’s identity in regard to its historical, political, 
economic situation.  
While an actor’s identity is based on these previously stated variables, an actor’s 
identity is also dependent on the structure in which an actor is set (Hopf 172). A structure can 
be defined best as a narrative or discourse in which an actor works within.  For example, the 
US projects a ‘great power’ identity and therefore within this structure, actions such as 
‘appeasement’ do not fit in as well as ‘military intervention’ would (Hopf 173). Therefore, if a 
nation-state wishes to incorporate another country into their nation, this nation-state first needs 
to create a framework in which this action is acceptable.  
 
2.2 ‘The Politics of Memory’ 
An essential component to the identity building process is that a collective identity can 
be built on a set of commonalities2 or memories between people that can be distorted to create 
citizens. Takeo David Hymans in his work ‘The Politics of Memory’ investigated why actors 
engage in the distortion of these commonalities by focusing on what he described as a 
‘distortion’ of collective national memories for the profit of political gain (Hymans 3). Takeo 
David Hymans’ concept of the politics of memory is a reapplied version of Thomas Hobbes 
concept of ‘Gain, Safety, and Reputation’ but with an East Asian focus (Hymans 3). The initial 
arrow of this three-pronged method of distortion starts with the concept of what actors gain by 
distorting collective national memories.  
The concept of gain, as described by Takeo David Hymans is that actors in order to 
grow their political power, engage in the act of distorting collective national memories towards 
a more ‘friendly’ or advantageous narrative (Hymans 3). Takeo Hymans illustrates this process 
through the example of China’s memory politics in which ‘Beijing has found in the legacy of 
invasion and atrocity a moral club to beat down its rival. Around the region, competing versions 
of the war buttress claims to territory and energy reserves disputed by Japan, Russia, the PRC 
and South Korea’ (Hymans 3). Therefore, ‘gain’ can be thought of as the arrow of memory 
                                                
2 Be they historical, political, economic or social  
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politics that manipulates memories to deal with international competition and/or regional 
relations to gain a competitive advantage.  
 Hymans’ concept of ‘safety’ tackles this issue by manipulating a nation’s collective 
memories and narratives and using them to bolster one’s legitimacy within a nation and gain 
the crucial support needed for future political endeavors (Hymans 3). An example of this 
process at work would be in Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power, ‘Deng Xiaoping raised the stakes 
on Japan’s whitewashing of history in 1982 to bolster legitimacy for himself and his reform 
agenda because the ‘old guard’ in the People’s Liberation Army – still in position to block 
Deng’s final consolidation of power – were blasting his pragmatism as harmful to ideology’ 
(Hymans 3).  
While the concept of ‘safety’ and ‘gain’ are two important arrows in the ‘politics of 
memory’ distortion, the most important arrow, at least in terms of Japan’s inclusion/ exclusion 
discourse is the arrow of ‘reputation’. The final arrow of ‘reputation’ carries greater impact 
than the previous two, as the ‘reputation’ arrow defines and forms the discourse that allows 
the previous two arrows to function as they do. The concept of ‘reputation’ deals with the 
national discourse, or what can be included inside a nation’s national collective narrative 
(Hymans 3). This differs from the previous two as the concept of ‘gain’ and ‘safety’ work 
within the discourse created by the reputation arrow. Hymans’ states that as ‘Moral authority 
is essential to political power; governments want historiography to foster pride in the nation 
and loyalty to the state.’ (3). This means that a nation-state wants and needs a collective history 
that allows its citizens to be proud of the nation-state and thus stay loyal. However, because 
governments need history to foster pride and loyalty in the nation-state, this presents the 
question of what if a nation’s history does not allow for citizens to gain national pride?  
The short answer to this is that nations create the narrative needed for citizens to gain 
pride and loyalty in the nation-state because ‘Getting history wrong is an essential part of being 
a nation’ (Hymans 3). Thus, through the distortion of memories into a new historical narrative, 
the reputation arrow creates the narrative necessary for the previous two arrows to function in. 
This process of nation-state discourse building lays at the foundation of Japan’s 
inclusion/exclusion discourse.  
 
2.3 Japan’s Memory Politics 
 
 Now that a general theoretical framework has been defined and set, it important to move 
into the more nation specific debate that raged in Japan in regard to the inclusion or exclusion 
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of newly acquired regions or areas that Japan wished to expand to. This debate was a 
continuous and evolving debate that spoke to the very nature of what it meant to be Japanese.  
During the initial years of the Meiji era (1868-1912) the concept of how to define Japaneseness 
was a heavily contested subject. The initial theory of the origins of the Japanese nation-state is 
that of the ‘Homogenous Nation theory’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 
xxviii). This theory outlines that the Japanese nation-state is a primordial entity and by 
extension the Japanese people are an entity that are also primordial in its being.  
With this Homogenous Nation theory came a certain understanding of what constituted 
the Japanese population, namely as a united ethnic group descended from the Tenson race 
(Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. xxviii). The Homogenous Nation theory 
comes with its own built in assumption that the Japanese people and nation are unique in nature 
and therefore superior because of its uniqueness (a quality that come back in later ideologies).  
 This understanding of the Japanese nation-state and population is a very primordial 
view of Japan’s origins. However, this Homogenous Nation theory was an academic response 
to initial ‘mixed nation’s theory’ studies that were being popularized in Western academia to 
the origins of the Japanese ethnic population.  Philip Franz von Siebold after his 1823 trip to 
Japan published his theory that Japan was in fact a mixed nation. This Mixed Nation theory 
explains that the Japanese ethnic group is combined from the indigenous Ainu and Tartar 
invaders who claimed dominance over what is now Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' 
Self-image. 4).  
Western theorists looked to Japanese mythology in the Kiki myths to justify these 
claims. The Kiki Myths contain stories of how the Emperor’s ancestors descended from heaven 
and how the first Emperor of Japan Jinmu, and Prince Yamato’s conquered the Kusamo native 
population (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 4). This story was seen by Western 
scholars as a metaphor for the creation of the Japanese nation. Therefore, ‘god was equated to 
man’ and the invasion by Prince Yamato equated to the Tartar nation’s victory over the native 
Ainu and conquest of the islands of Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 4). 
The Mixed Nation theory was a Western understanding of how the Japanese nation came to be 
and that was imported to the Japanese populace. However, it was exactly this Western 
dominance in the field of Japan’s origins that spurred the Homogenous Nation theory.  
With the growth of the Japanese Empire came the new movement of people in and out 
of the Japanese borders. This interaction brought about a new issue of the Japanese interior and 
the Japanese national’s place within the Japanese nation-state. As stated previously, Japan 
perceived strength and security came from the notion that the nation was built upon one ethnic 
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group that was united under the Emperor. However, with the opening of Japan and the 
immigration of Westerners, the question of Japan’s superiority/ inferiority complex came into 
question (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 23). Scholar Inoue Tetsujiro worried 
about this ethnic mixing of the Japanese interior as he felt that the Japanese race was of an 
inferior one. By the mixing of a superior race (Westerners) and an inferior one over a long-
term period would cause the superior race to assume control, much like the Tartar nation did 
with the native inhabitants of Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 22). 
Inoue, much like Homogenous Nation theory scholars found that Japan’s strength laid 
in its homogenous nature. Therefore, due to Japan’s strength stemming from its ‘uniqueness’, 
Inoue suggested that Japan and by extension the Japanese people should not live outside the 
borders of Japan. He went on to explain that ‘The only place in the whole world where the 
Japanese can live is Japan and Japan alone […] Under these circumstances, if we allow 
foreigners to live with us, the people of Europe and America will enter Japan and will take 
possession of our land’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 23). Thus, the essence 
of Inoue’s argument is that Japan should once again shut its borders to foreigners and preserve 
what he perceived to be the strength and core of the Japanese nation-state. However, while the 
Japanese Empire did perceive itself as ‘weak’ compared to its Western counterparts, the 
Japanese Empire took the opposite route that Inoue suggested and began looking outwards to 
solve its inferiority issues.  
The Japanese Empire’s growing ambition to expand to neighboring countries can be 
seen in the annexation of Taiwan in 1895 and the steady vassal state relationship that Japan 
held over Korea until annexation in 1910. This ambition to expand the Japanese Empire 
through the colonialization of its neighboring countries presented an issue with both the 
justification of Japan’s core strengths and the definition of what constituted Japan. As 
previously stated, scholars such as Inoue Tetsujiro or Hozumi Yatsuka both viewed Japan’s 
strength in its uniqueness, which stems from its general homogenous nature. Both these 
scholars along with Kato Hiroyuki reaffirmed Japan’s uniqueness by stating that Japan is a 
family-state and that the Japanese people were like children who were united under their father 
or the Emperor (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 35). This family-state under 
the Emperor came be known as kokutai or National Polity theory.  
While the National Polity theory did bring a new consensus on what constituted Japan, 
it did limit and grind to a halt Japan’s colonial ambitions. The reason for this halt was because 
if the boundaries of Japan are defined as a family-state under the Emperor, what right did Japan 
have to subjugate its neighboring states as colonies? Tessa Morris Suzuki best summarized this 
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issue by stating ‘Was Japan’s right to rule the colonies based upon the innate racial superiority 
of the Japanese rulers vis-à-vis their colonial subjects? Or was it based, on the contrary, on 
racial or cultural commonalities between rulers and ruled? Or did it derive from the fact that 
Japanese society embodied a more advanced form of a single modern civilization?’ (Re-
inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 87). Faced with these questions, Japan was left with a 
few options on how to move forward under kokutai. Firstly, it could abandon the idea of a 
homogenous nation and continue its assimilation of neighboring countries. Another opinion 
was that it could continue the assimilation process but have to openly admit that its 
colonialization was merely an attempt at growing its power and that kokutai was not a natural 
structure for the Japanese state. Lastly, it could follow Inoue Tetsujiro’s advice and close off 
the borders of Japan and focus on its own uniqueness to find strength (A Genealogy of 
'Japanese' Self-image. 51). 
While the structural features of kokutai created issues with Japan’s colonization, the 
manner in which this problem was solved strikes at the heart of Japan’s fluid understanding of 
what constitutes being ‘Japanese’. Scholars such as Hoshino Hisashi and Kume Kinitake both 
did not view kokutai’s understandings of the Japanese population as an issue as they viewed 
the ancient alien Korean Koryo nation3 as the alien Tartar nation that was described in the Kiki 
myths (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 65). Through this understanding of 
common ancestry that Hoshino and Kume had proposed, the argument for invading Korea 
became more justifiable. Hoshino even went on to saying that ‘since Japan and Korea used to 
be one region, the Imperial Family’s arrival from the peninsula was little more than a domestic 
trip within a single country’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 68). Linguist 
Kanazawa Shouzaburo proceeded to further Hoshino’s and Kume’s claim by examining the 
commonalities between the Japanese and Korean languages and stating that ‘The language of 
Korea belongs to the same family as the language of the Great Japanese Empire […]’ (Oguma, 
A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 74). However, despite this apparent justification, 
national polity theorist and nativist theorist alike heavily criticized the common ancestry theory.  
 For National Polity theorists, the suggestion that the Imperial Family could have come 
from anywhere other than Japan was in line with treason and was seen to be unpatriotic. 
(Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 67) Nativist scholars such as Mootori 
Norinaga also rejected this theory and called it ‘the words of a mad man’ (Oguma, A Genealogy 
of 'Japanese' Self-image. 65). The strong objection towards the common ancestry theory stems 
                                                
3	the ancient Korean nation from folklore	
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from the same inferiority/superiority complex defined by Inoue Tetsujiro. Namely that 
‘Koreans were a different race from the ‘Japanese’ […] at the extreme, might also provide an 
excuse for Korea to annex Japan’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 69). This 
view largely aligns with Inoue’s notion that Japan was a weak nation that was vulnerable to 
the Western nations and surrounding Asian nations. Yet after victories in the Sino-Japanese 
war and the Russo-Japanese war, the narrative of the National Polity theory and narrative of 
Japan as a weak nation began to change.  
 The unique relationship that the National Polity theory presented between the Emperor 
and the Japanese subject was one of genuine affection. However, with the incorporation of 
Taiwan, the annexation of Korea and the beginning of a more multicultural empire in the 
Taisho era (1911-25), the National Polity’s understanding of the relationship between subject 
and sovereign began to lose relevancy. This problem was solved by reexamining the general 
understanding of the ‘family state’ and not focusing on blood family but that of ‘adopted 
families’. This view was addressed in the journal Toa no Hikari or ‘The Light of East Asia’ 
(1918). Oshima Masanori suggested that these alien nations should be treated as ‘foster family 
or adopted children’ to the Empire (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 119). This 
concept presented a unique opportunity to national polity theorists as it allowed them to keep 
the Emperor as the head of the family state and integrate new nations.  
This new formation of the National Polity theory matched far better with the mix nation 
theory proposed by Kita Sadakichi wherein he outlined that the Japanese people were a mixture 
of indigenous Ainu, that the Northern Japanese descended from mainland Chinese and Koreans, 
while Southern Japanese descended from the Negeriods and Malay of Southern Asia (“A 
Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-image” 98; “Re-inventing Japan” 91). Thus, Kita saw Japan more 
as a ‘melting pot’ of different people and refuted the notion that Japan was very a homogenous 
nation. Kita instead argued that ‘many people of different lineages have lived together in this 
archipelago for long periods of time and in the process have intermarried, adopted one 
another’s customs, merged their languages and eventually forgotten where they came from’ 
(Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91).  
Kita, who spent much of his career researching the subject of Japan’s racial hybridity, 
saw Japan’s ability to incorporate the various ethnic groups into one minzoku as one of the 
strongest qualities of the Yamato Minzoku4 (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, 
Nation 91). However, Kita felt it was the imperial family that played a central role in uniting 
                                                
4	The	term	Kita	used	to	describe	the	inhabitants	of	Japan		
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the Yamato Minzoku. Kita argued that ‘the strongest bond uniting the Yamato Minzoku was the 
presence of ‘a single imperial line existing from time immemorial’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-
inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91). Thus, the understanding of Emperor as the head of 
the national ‘family’ was not abandoned but instead reinterpreted to be the metaphorical head 
instead of a biological one. Therefore, the Emperor was no longer seen as a blood relative of 
all Japanese, but ‘the descendent of ancestors who role had been to unite the diverse people of 
Japan into a single political and cultural community’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: 
Time, Space, Nation 91).  
 Torii Ryuzo in his book Yushi izen no Nippon (pre-historical Japan) reconfirmed Kita’s 
notion that the Japanese people are a mixture of the indigenous Ainu who were conquered by 
the Chinese and Korean mainlanders in the north and Malay and Negeriods of South Asia in 
the south. This was done by comparing the pottery and physical features of the people that live 
in North/South Japan to their respective areas (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 
130). Therefore, according to Torii this is the reason why you have Japanese with ‘Mainland’ 
facial structures and then people who are darker in complexion, with hairier arms, faces, etc. 
(Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 130). The timing of Torii’s reconfirmation of 
the common ancestry between Japan and Korea shows the degree of fluidity of concept of 
‘Japaneseness’ can be.  
When looking back on how the concept and understanding of Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’ 
has changed, be it from its initial Homogenous Nation theory or the Western understanding of 
a mixed nation to Inoue’s National Polity theory, and finally towards the imperialistic 
understanding of National Polity theory, it can be seen that this constantly changing concept 
has been defining and redefining itself along with Japan’s then-current situation. The logic of 
Foucault’s governmentality, and La Pierrere’s concept of governed/governor can be seen in 
Japan’s constant (re)defining of what constitutes a Japanese subject.  
It was Takeo Hymans’ concept of ‘the politics of memory’ that ultimately explained 
why nation-states engage in distorting memories. Thus, through Hymans’ three arrows, Japan 
was able to adjust the definition of Japaneseness to justify its imperial ambitions. However, at 
the same time because of the fluid nature of the concept Japaneseness, Japan was 
simultaneously able to keep the National Polity’s core value of the Emperor/ subject 
relationship being based in one of love and understanding and not of one based on domination/ 
power. Therefore, the final imperialistic form of the National Polity theory is a logically step 
in Takeo Hymans’ three arrow’s concept. Nevertheless, this was not the only type of memory 
politics that Japan participated in, the following chapter will explain how even the 
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conceptualization of provinces such as Okinawa and Hokkaido bring into question the 
conceptualization of the nation.  
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Chapter 3: The building of a nation  
 
In chapter two, the theoretical framework that this thesis will be working under was 
explained. Along with this, chapter two historicized the progression of the various theories that 
influenced the conceptualization of what constituted Japaneseness and how this was used to 
justify expanding the Japanese Empire into countries such as Korea. This fluid and adaptable 
concept of Japaneseness was also used in distorting the understanding of what constitutes the 
modern Japanese citizen. Unlike Korea, which has its own post-colonial memories and 
narratives that make the breaking down of Japan’s wartime distortions ‘clearer’, it is nearly 
impossible to conceptualize contemporary Japan without including the minority group of the 
Ainu and the province of Okinawa. Nevertheless, even this fundamental understanding of what 
constitutes Japan is built upon distorted narratives. Therefore, this chapter argues that when the 
origins of the Ainu’s and Okinawan’s Japaneseness are deconstructed, the inclusion of the Ainu 
and Okinawans as fundamentally Japanese is a result of more distorted narratives.  
When considering the contemporary conceptualization of Japan, it is nearly impossible to 
consider Japan without thinking of the main islands that form it, namely Honshu, Shikoku, 
Kyushu, Hokkaido and Okinawa. However, the inclusion of these last two islands as 
fundamental parts of Japan’s Japaneseness presents a unique paradox, in that when the people 
of these islands were added to the Japanese Empire, they were viewed as fundamentally 
different from the rest of the Japanese minzoku. An example of this can be seen in 1875 after 
the establishment of the Ryukyu5 domain. Articles such as one in the Yochi hochi shimbun 
began criticizing the Japanese government for uselessly spending labour and capital on 
subordinating the Ryukyu domain, and that they should abandon the Ryukyu domain and sell 
off Yezo (Hokkaido’s former name) to focus on Japan’s domestic affairs (Oguma, Okinawa 
1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 17). This perspective of the Ryukyuan/ Ainu people 
as outsiders instead of being a part of the domestic people contrasts with the official 
government position.  
 Even amongst the general public there seemed to be divided opinions concerning 
whether the Ainu belonged amongst the core or the periphery. In 1901, under the ‘Rules for 
Former Native Children’s Education’, Ainu language, history and culture were abolished. In 
the 1930s, Ainu children were taught through the ‘Ordinary Elementary School National 
History’ which placed the Ainu people within the history of the Japanese Empire (Yoshimi 
                                                
5	The Ryukyu kingdom after its abolishment went on to became the Ryukyu domain and later 
the province of Okinawa	
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127). Due to the Ainu’s place within this historical narrative, many wajin (ethnic Japanese) 
students and teachers began to discriminate against Ainu children for ‘being descendants of 
‘traitors’ who had not submitted to the Emperor’s rule (Yoshimi 128). The denotation of the 
Ainu as ‘other’ and foreign was reinforced by the very notion of the Japanese minzoku. With 
an increasing consciousness of what Japan (Nihon) was, came also an increasing tendency to 
link the Japanese national identity with that of the Japanese volk (minzoku) (Morris-Suzuki, 
Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 32). However, it also created the issue where Nihon 
had become not only the signifier of a nation-state, but also an ethnonym of the Nihonjin 
(Japanese) (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 32). This placed the Ainu 
in a unique junction within Japanese society, where they were considered enough a part of 
society to be traitors to the Emperor but yet still foreign enough to be outsiders within Japanese 
society. 
The deep contrast between the public’s position and that of the government’s is furthered 
when the initial conflict between the Qing dynasty and the Meiji government over under who’s 
rule the Ryukyu domain should belong is considered. In 1871, in response to Ryukyuan 
nationals drifting ashore to Taiwan and being killed by Taiwanese aboriginals, the Japanese 
government responded by dispatching troops two and a half years later under the pretext of 
‘protecting its own citizens’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). 
This spurred the Qing Dynasty to question the legitimacy of Japan’s claim on the Ryukyu 
kingdom, as China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had a long-standing vassal state relationship. 
However, the Japan’s government’s position was that the people of the Ryukyu domain were 
‘until the bitter end Japanese’. Thus, to attack the Ryukyuan people was to attack the Japanese 
people and it falls under the Japan’s jurisdiction not the Qing dynasty, to dispatch troops to 
protect their nationals (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). This 
understanding of Ryukyuans as Japanese gave Japan the proper justification to protect its 
‘citizens’.  
 This position was not however reciprocated by the Japanese people, let alone by other 
department of Japan’s government. Okuma Shigenobu and Kido Takayoshi, who were a part 
of a faction against the deployment of troops to Taiwan, stated that their positions on Ryukyu’s 
status was ‘Only the people of the so-called outer domains, surprisingly, are not as our people’ 
and ‘there should be a difference in the degree of intimacy between the domestic populace and 
themselves’ respectively (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). 
Despite this opposition, it seemed that it was more important for the troops to be deployed to 
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Taiwan so that Japan could officially claim control over the Ryukyu domain than it was for the 
general opinion of whether the Ryukyuans were Japanese to be taken into consideration. 
Japan’s public opinion that the Ryukyuan people did not belong as a part of the domestic 
populace and are of a different race is one that was also held by the foreign diplomats that 
visited Japan. Matthew Perry upon his visit in 1853, was also struck by the differences in 
physical and linguistic characteristics between the Japanese and the people of the Ryukyu 
domain (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 31). Perry’s belief in the 
difference between the Ryukyuan and Japanese was so strongly held that it was a view that 
persisted up until the American invasion after the Pacific war. (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: 
Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 31). This left Japan as the only nation advocating that the people 
of the Ryukyu domain were Japanese at their core and Japan did not let the international or 
domestic perception of the Ryukyu domain change this fact.  
This did not change the view of individuals such as disposition officer Matsuda Michiyuki 
from showing the racial and linguistic similarity between the Ryukyuans and Japanese minzoku 
(Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 28). Matsuda stressed the 
Ryukyuan’s Japaneseness by stating ‘the Ryukyu race is of our Satsuma race skeletal structure 
and body […] upon hearing Ryukyuan peoples tone of voice, it is purely our country’s tone of 
voice, [while] the speech sounds are those of Satsuma’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: 
Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 28). However, while this use of memory politics to justify Japan 
sole occupation of the Ryukyu domain presents complications to an already distorted narrative, 
it is not until the formation of the Okinawan province that Japan further distorts the quality of 
Japaneseness to separate Okinawa from the Ryukyu Kingdom. 
The distortion of the Ryukyuans’ place within Japan was further complicated once the 
Ryukyuans were subjected to mandatory education by the Japanese Empire. This process 
started in 1887 when the sovereignty debate had been settled and the Ryukyu domain had been 
annexed by the Japanese Empire and promptly renamed the Okinawan prefecture (Oguma, 
Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 47). In support of the mission of reminding 
the newly minted Okinawan people that they have always been Japanese since ‘ancient times’ 
but they had ‘simply forgotten they deserved to be Japanese’, the Japanese government 
published the ‘Journal of Ryukyu education’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and 
Exclusion Vol 1 47). The education of the Okinawans on their ‘Japaneseness’ was intended to 
enforce Japanese ‘normality’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 27).  
This notion that there was a set of recognizable ‘Japanese’ norms that the Okinawans 
needed to mimic in order to assimilate became widespread amongst Okinawan intellectuals 
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(Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 28). Some Okinawans thought that 
the enforcement of ‘normality’ needed to be taken so far as to mimic the manner in which the 
wajin sneezed (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 28). The Japanese 
government viewed this education as returning the Okinawans to their natural state of 
Japaneseness and not a form of national identity creation in that it would propose an unnatural 
process.  
The reintroduction of the Japanese consensus cannot only be seen in the introduction of the 
Ryukyu education but also in the process of ‘restoring’ Okinawa to its proper name. Nitta 
Yoshitaka a teacher in the Okinawa Prefectural Ordinary Teacher’s Training School has stated 
that Okinawa was the area’s ancient name and that the ‘crafty’ Chinese had changed it to 
Ryukyu over hundreds of years of influence (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and 
Exclusion Vol 1 50). This Chinese influence on Okinawa is further described by Nitta, ‘the 
name Ryukyu is the name of ‘the unchaste woman called dual subordination, who lowered her 
head to China […] Okinawa was the name restored to the chaste woman who would give birth 
to the sons of Japan’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 51). This 
invocation of national consensus that had been distorted or lost due to foreign influences did 
not end at suggesting that Okinawa had lost it way.  
Nitta proceeded to explain the distinction between Okinawa and the Ryukyu Kingdom by 
explaining that ‘Okinawa being in all respects the Okinawa islands of our Japan, … the country 
of Ryukyu has its own separate land’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion 
Vol 1 51). Nitta proceeds to justify separating the Okinawa and Ryukyu from each other by 
using Sui Dynasty documents that saw the Ryukyuans as a barbaric race that were believed to 
take part in cannibalistic practices. However, unlike the barbaric Rykyuans, the Okinawans 
were Japanese who were ‘racially Japanese, Japanese compatriots, with common ancestry with 
Japan’ and would not partake in such savage traditions as eating human flesh (Oguma, 
Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 51). This attempt to establish a historical 
claim over Okinawa while at the same time dismissing the Ryukyu Kingdom as a perversion 
of history memories shows the extent of Japan’s memory politics as it creates a Japanese island 
(Okinawa) that was lost in time and distorted into a shell of itself (Ryukyu Kingdom).  
The distortion of memories used to separate the identities of the Ryukyuans from the 
Okinawans placed both on a dichotomy; namely associating the Ryukyuans as barbarians and 
the Okinawans as civilized Japanese. However, this distortion was not only seen in the 
‘restoration’ of Okinawa’s name but also in ‘restoration’ of the Okinawan people’s ‘proper’ 
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Japanese names. During the Edo period (1603-1868), the Satsuma domain forbid the 
Okinawans from adopting Japanese sounding names in order to proudly show the shogun that 
they ruled over a ‘foreign land’ (Yoshimi 121). However, in 1937 the Okinawa Education 
Association’s ‘Committee to Investigate the Revision of Surname Pronunciation’ sought to 
spare the Okinawans from being discriminated against for being perceived as a different ethnic 
group than that of mainland Japan (naichi) by restoring them with their ‘rightful’ Japanese 
names (Yoshimi 121). Thus, this further distanced the civilized Okinawan people from the 
‘barbaric’ Ryukyuans and brought the Okinawans closer to the naichi.  
Nitta attempts to further this distinction between the Ryukyuans and the Okinawans by 
presenting a peculiar and still ironic parallel between the barbarism of the Ryukyuans and a 
later Japanese colony, Taiwan. Nitta explained that to think of Ryukyu was to think of Taiwan, 
in that they are both barbaric nations and he wished to save Okinawa the shame of being seen 
in the same light as Taiwan (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 52).  
During the early 20th century, when Japan’s rule over Taiwan was consolidated, there was 
a growing need for the Taiwanese subjects to be integrated into the Japanese minzoku. Japan’s 
use of the Doka policy showed the logic of governmentality at work within Taiwan, in that it 
constructed schools (kogakko), forced individuals to adopt a Japanese name, promoted the 
speaking of Japanese, and banned the learning of Chinese classics (Tsurumi 620). While this 
thesis does not focus on to which extent the Doka system succeeded, it is important to 
understand the rationale behind why the Doka system was adopted.  
The reason why the Doka system was adopted can be seen in its alignment with the National 
Polity theory. As previously explained the newer imperialistic National Polity theory stated 
that Japan was composed of individuals who came from mainland Asia (China and Korea), 
however this is also expanded to include Taiwanese coming to Japan through Okinawa (Hsu 
7). Thus, the rationale behind using the Doka system is that ‘The Taiwanese and the Yamato 
?? nation were the same people with an identical script and race’ (Hsu 7). When Japan’s 
understanding of its relationship with Taiwan is compared with that of Okinawa or Korea, a 
trend is further developed of an ever expanding and fluid historical narrative that justifies 
Japan’s political and colonial aims.  
This pragmatic historical view becomes clearer when Japan’s earlier stance on how the 
Ryukyuans and Taiwanese were ‘barbaric’ tribes and could not be decedents of the civilized 
Japanese. Consequently, Japan’s view of Taiwan highlights how Japan’s understanding of 
Japaneseness is reconstructed and deconstructed towards their needs by memory politics. 
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However, unlike Ryukyu and Taiwan, Okinawa was Japanese at their core but had lost their 
way and their insufficient consciousness of being ‘Japanese’ stems from the Okinawans 
‘lagging behind in their progress’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 
1 49).  
This argument, namely that there is a temporal trajectory that a civilization undergoes 
towards their ‘true’ form and thus the difference between people is merely that one civilization 
is further developed than another, brings about a new understanding of ‘how’ Japanese one 
could be. Tessa Morris-Suzuki explains this understanding as an effect of Social Darwinism 
and how it placed these various countries on a continuum, with Japanese consciousness being 
something that Okinawans or Ainu have not yet learned in their progression towards 
civilization (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 86). However, it should not be 
misunderstood that this ‘space’ and ‘time’ understanding of one’s Japaneseness replaced the 
understanding of race and/or by common ancestry, but instead that these various mechanisms 
of distortion were interwoven into a more complex distortion mechanism.   
With the addition of the spatial and temporal understanding of how the Ainu and 
Okinawans fit within the framework of Japaneseness, Japan was able to show this temporal 
progression through racial sciences. Thus, because the Ainu were seen as both the original 
inhabitants of Japan in Kita’s Mixed Nation theory and also seen as temporally lagging behind, 
this sparked a complex racial debate over the relationship between these ‘ancient Japanese’ and 
the ‘modern’ Japanese (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 86). This 
prompted an anthropological skull measuring between the Ainu and ‘modern’ Japanese to 
illustrate the evolution of the Japanese minzoku. However, the results of these racial studies did 
not create a more unified minzoku that was separated only a temporal lag. Instead such studies 
generated crude images of the Ainu physical characteristics which furthered the internal racism 
that the Ainu felt within the Japanese society (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, 
Nation 86). Thus, by adding this temporal and spatial component to defining the boundaries of 
Japan’s Japaneseness, a narrative was created where these minority groups instead of being 
considered ethnically different, are excluded from the minzoku based on their racial 
‘backwardness’ compared to the majority.  
The contemporary image of Japan cannot be seen complete without the inclusion of the 
islands Hokkaido and Okinawa. However, the inclusion of these islands and its inhabitants, 
namely the Ainu and the Okinawans as fundamental parts of the Japan nation-state is not a 
natural state but instead a result of memory distortion. This chapter has shown that initially 
when these minority groups were brought into the Empire, many Japanese felt they were a part 
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of the exterior, and therefore should not take importance over the ‘interior Japanese’. However, 
just as in Korea; the narrative in which the Ainu or the Okinawans were situated within Japan 
changed. These changes were not used to better assimilate these ‘foreign’ groups but instead 
used to show these minority groups how they were ‘without a doubt’ Japanese.  
Thus, the Ryukyu kingdom came to be seen as a distortion of the Okinawan’s Japanese 
memories and that by restoring their Okinawan identity they were ‘liberating’ the Okinawan 
people from their years of oppression. Soon after the distortion of the Okinawan and Ainu 
narrative was furthered through stating that these minority groups were simply lagging behind 
in progress towards civilization and because of this, had not yet reached their natural state of 
being a Japanese citizen. This temporal understanding of who is included/excluded as a 
member of the Japanese Empire adds an additional layer of distortion to the concept of 
Japaneseness by allowing an individual’s Japaneseness to be something that can be developed 
over time. 
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Chapter 4: Building on a Legacy 
 
The previous two chapters have sought to explain the ambiguous and fluid concept that is 
‘Japaneseness’ and place this phenomenon in a historical context. The progression of Japan’s 
distorted memories from Homogenous Nation theory to the National Polity theory and the 
adoptability of the inclusion/exclusion of nations and people is fundamental when addressing 
Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism. When Shinzo Abe’s redefinition 
of nationalism towards kokuminshugi is examined through this term Japaneseness, the term 
kokuminshugi can be seen as the contemporary form of the term Japaneseness being redefined 
for political objectives. Therefore, this chapter shall address Shinzo Abe’s proposed 
nationalism shift with reference to historical antecedents. This will be accomplished by 
examining how minority groups such as the Zainichi Korean create issues with kokumins more 
inclusive redefinition and the historical revisionism that is created by this redefinition.  
Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift of nationalism from minzokushugi to kokuminshugi and the 
linguistic rationality behind this shift needs to be examined in light of Japan’s political/ 
economic situation during which Abe’s book was published. In 2006 when Abe published his 
book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’, there were several problems that the country that was 
once predicted to overtake the United States as the world’s biggest economy faced. The biggest 
of these problems being Japan’s stagnating economy mixed with its problem of 
shoushikoureika6. 
Japan was only six years removed from what was called the ‘lost decade’ or the time 
following the bursting the Japan’s asset bubble where Japan’s GDP between 1995 - 2006 
plummeted from US$ 5.45 trillion to US$ 4.53 trillion (Worldbank.org). Along with this 
decline, the average wages in Japan had been steadily decreasing, while at the same time the 
average costs of goods had been steadily increasing (Waging a new war). However, the worst 
of these issues was Japan’s shoushikoureika, where Japan was facing an aging workforce/ 
population which was over 20% of the total population in 2006 and a decreasing fertility rate 
which had fallen to 1.32 children per woman7 (Japantimes.co.jp; Worldbank.org). This put 
Japan in a unique situation of suffering from both decreasing economic production and at the 
same time a decreasing workforce; inhibiting one of the mechanisms in which one can tackle 
the problem of decreasing economic production. 
                                                
6	A state of low fertility and a rapidly aging population		
7	The number of children required per woman to keep a population from decreasing or the 
replacement rate is 2.1 children per woman.		
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 These problems only seemed to worsen as time progressed, and by Shinzo Abe’s second 
term (2013) as Prime Minister and the republishing of his book as ‘Towards a New Country’, 
it seemed that a new solution would be needed to solve these problems. This need for a new 
solution can be seen in the parallel between Japan’s need for new labour and the redefining of 
Japanese nationalism. Japan has become more open to importing labour from foreign countries 
in recent years with Central Bank Governor Haruhiko Kuroda stating that ‘more foreign labor 
is essential for Japan to achieve sustainable long-term growth’ (Curran and Cislo). However, 
with the large influx of unskilled labour, the government had also taken the stance these 
unskilled workers were not ‘immigrants’, but guest workers who will be providing temporary 
services within Japan (Curran and Cislo). Nevertheless, to facilitate this need for new labour, 
Abe has promised to make Japan’s process to acquiring citizenship one of the fastest in the 
world (Curran and Cislo). With the road to Japanese citizenship becoming more relaxed and 
an influx of new citizens/ labourers, the question of how does one assimilate or integrate this 
new wave of people into Japanese society arises.  
 Under this objective and framing, the reason why the redefinition of Japan’s 
nationalism began to take shape. When reexamining the concept of ethnic nationalism and the 
previously outlined theories of Homogenous Nation theory, National Polity theory, a 
significant emphasis is place on being of a similar ancestry or ethnic lineage. Thus, for the sake 
of this analysis the term minzokushugi will be used to describe the focus of how nationalism 
has thus far been defined and viewed to a large extent. This understanding of ‘Japaneseness’ 
outside the realm of colonialization no longer allows for inclusion and integration of new 
citizens and labourers. Abe’s redefinition towards a kokuminshugi framework however, 
presents a framework that allows for the integration of these people. Abe addresses this in his 
book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ when discussing Brazilian born football players Ruy 
Ramos who played for the Japanese national team in the 1993. Stating ‘We really have to see 
that this sense of belonging to the community is found in this consciousness that anyone who 
fights under the Hi-no-Maru flag, regardless of his country of origin, is one of us’ (Abe 85). 
This description is a core understanding of what Abe’s kokuminshugi is; namely being Japanese 
at heart regardless of one’s origins.  
 
4.1 Zainichi Korean 
 
 The case of Ruy Ramos best presents this new form of nationalism, as Ramos came to 
Japan in 1977 and took on Japanese citizenship in 1989 (‘Former Japan’ Japantimes.co.jp). 
	 26	
According to Abe, the most remarkable thing was Ramos sense of nationalism. Abe stated that 
‘At the “Doha tragedy” of 1993, when Japan failed to qualify for World Cup ‘[Ruy] Ramos 
shed tears of disappointment along with the Japanese’ (K. M. Doak 271). This sense of 
nationalism for Japan shown by a new national is how Japaneseness should be defined 
according to Abe, by their loyalty to the nation-state. However, even this definition presents 
complications when the cases of minorities within Japan are considered.  
 With Abe’s focus on the very curiously named ‘civic’ nationalism and one’s allegiances 
towards the nation-state and the flag, it seems that Abe has neglected minorities in Japan such 
as the Zainichi Korean or internalized Koreans, who present a complication to the validity and 
execution of the kokuminshugi framework. Zainichi Koreans are a minority group of ethnic 
Koreans which chose to stay in Japan after the Pacific war and after Korea gained its 
independence. This group of ethnic Koreans find themselves in a legal grey area in Japan, as 
many of them do not hold Japanese citizenship even though most if not all of the second and 
third generations were born and raised in Japan. Instead of being defined as kokumin or 
Japanese nationals, most Zainichi Koreans hold a permanent residency status (eijuken) 
(Chapman 61). It is this very definition of permanent resident that highlights the inconsistent 
application of kokumin and shows the logic of Foucault’s governmentality at work to 
include/exclude specific populations from Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’.  
 When examining the case of Ruy Ramos, the use of kokumin as proposed by Abe 
becomes quite appealing, as it describes an open society where one is accepted regardless of 
an individual’s ethnicity. However, the juxtaposed position between the Zainichi Korean’s 
residency status, identity and societal integration show that in practice this ideal kokumin is not 
as black and white. Professor Suh Yong-dal of Momoyama Gakuin University speaks on this 
subject, saying ‘I would like the notion of kokumin to be expanded to include both Japanese 
who hold Japanese nationality as well as resident foreigners who have foreign nationality and 
for both to be included as Japanese kokumin (Chapman 60). This addresses the biggest problem 
of the use of distorted memories to create a collective narrative that defines/ redefines nationals 
that are included or excluded by the nation-state, namely that identities are complex narratives 
intertwined with not just the broader kokumin status but also the ethno, social, and cultural 
aspects that make up the inner core of one’s identity. Thus, to focus only on the kokumin aspect 
of identity and ignore the other aspects does creates the opportunity for the inclusion of more 
people, however it also creates the situation for the exclusion or prejudice of another, much 
like in the case of the Zainichi Koreans.  
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When examining the case of the Zainichi Koreans, Abe’s focus on an individual’s 
relation to the state being the defining characteristic to whether one is a kokumin or not becomes 
rather problematic. This problem stems from the fact that by only focusing on one’s relation to 
the state, aspects such as cultural and social norms are ignored. For example, the second and 
third generation Zainichi speak Japanese as their first language, received their primary and 
secondary education through the Japanese educational system and were raised within the same 
Japanese society and thus by the same societal norms as residents of Japan. In addition to this, 
Koreans are not always readily racially identifiable from Japanese, and their taste for or lack 
of taste for Korean food is not a defining characteristic. Tessa Morris-Suzuki rather finds that 
the ‘difference’ between the minority and the majority is not an innate set of behaviors or 
beliefs, but instead a symbolic understanding of difference (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, 
Nation 196). This symbolic understanding of the difference between the Zainichi population 
and Japanese residents is that the Zainichi identify themselves as Zainichi and that they are 
also identified as Zainichi by the residents of Japan (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 
196).  
Nevertheless, the differences between the Zainichi population and the ‘Japanese 
citizens’ does not only stem from their acknowledgement of these differences but it is also 
important to examine how these differences are preserved within Japan’s organizational 
structures. Morris-Suzuki best describes the issue that arises from this understanding, namely 
that it ‘is not a simple question of whether the “minority” should become the same as the 
“majority” or should be allowed to remain different. It is a question of the way in which 
boundaries are maintained, shifted, and reinterpreted in the process of struggles over the nature 
of the state’ (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). It is this statement that the logic 
of Benedict Anderson’s theory of ‘Imagined Communities’ can be seen, namely that these 
Zainichi communities are socially constructs created by the community themselves but 
reinforced by the Japanese nation-state to more clearly create a distinction between the kokumin 
and the non-kokumin. Therefore, Zainichi Koreans best highlight this struggle over the identity 
that is (not) included within the term kokumin and how (non) inclusive it can be.  
Irrespective of whether the Zainichi population can be considered culturally or socially 
kokumin, they are still dealt with as foreigners; be it in their kokumin status or employment 
discrimination.  In the 1970s, a prime example of employment discrimination against the 
Zainichi population is illustrated by the Hitachi company case. The court case concerned Pak 
Chong-sok who applied to the Hitachi company under this Japanese name (which he 
considered his real name at the time), and was accepted. Upon being unable to provide a birth 
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certificate and a family register which all Japanese citizens had, he was told that his position 
was no longer available because ‘Hitachi did not employ foreigners’ (Chapman 34). While Pak 
did ultimately win his court case in 1974 against Hitachi for racial employment practices, this 
court case does document the curious change in the way that Korean citizens were viewed 
within Japan. In 1947, when the amendments to the Japanese constitution were ratified, the 
Japanese population went from being imperial subjects to Japanese kokumin (Chapman 68). At 
the same time this meant that Korean citizens moved from being essentially Japanese through 
their common ancestral ties, to being foreigners.   
 Despite the Zainichi population being the highest naturalizing population within Japan, 
with nearly 9,000 – 11,000 Zainichi naturalizing per year, it does not seem to change the 
discriminatory practices in Japan (Shipper 71). Kim Tong-Myung saw naturalizing as deeply 
concerning and ultimately a waste of time as Kim felt that the Japanese society did not make a 
distinction between the non-naturalized and the naturalized and that both were discriminated 
against equally (Chapman 54). Chong Yong Hye raised an equally important point in that ‘to 
place oneself too firmly within the predefined category of ethnic minority’ is, in effect to 
validate existing stereotypes about the homogeneity and purity of the majority’ (Re-inventing 
Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). By that logic identifying oneself as either ‘purely’ Korean or 
‘impurely’ Korean means there is a ‘purely’ Japanese or ‘impurely’ Japanese as well (Re-
inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). This type of identification creates a false 
dichotomy and reinforces the notion of a singular kokumin and ignores that identity lives on 
the ‘borderlines’ of different narratives.  
The change of Koreans within Japan from imperial subjects that shared common 
ancestry to adopted members of the Japanese ie8 to internalized foreigners who do not belong 
as a part of the Japanese kokumin, further shows the impact that La Perriere’s concept of how 
the governed/ governor relationship is defined has (refer to pg. 9). However, La Perriere’s 
concept shows the issues with using kokumin in the way that it is defined now. As kokumin 
requires to some extent that the kokumin show loyalty to the nation and the flag, and has a very 
limiting understanding of what can be a part of the Japanese national identity. Ultimately, it is 
the state that plays the crucial role in defining the various range of identities that are available 
to its citizens. This is because the state needs to determine which people amongst those who 
live within its borders are citizens without ‘renouncing crucial parts of their symbolic heritage’ 
(Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 201). It is by determining these 
                                                
8	House, referring back to the Japanese society being seen as a family		
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boundaries and markers of citizenship that minorities such as the Ainu and Zainichi can 
determine the boundaries of their own communal identities as well.  
The justification of why nation-states set these boundaries can be seen back in Hymans’ 
second arrow of ‘safety’, however instead of focusing on an individual, the focus should be on 
the nation-state’s safety. Morris-Suzuki has stated that ‘in the language of national identity, 
there is a profound and almost unquestioned image of society as fragile entity which, without 
a powerful center of gravity is liable to fly apart into chaos (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, 
Nation 202). Therefore, the nation-state through using distorting commonalities and/or 
collective memories, defines the boundaries of the state and ensures its stability. This is what 
Morris-Suzuki states the function of a minority group is, namely that ‘it is useful for the 
national population to encompass small groups that fail the test of belonging because it is only 
through the visible failure of defined ‘minorities’ that the state can repeatedly reassure itself of 
the invisible homogeneity and loyalty of the majority (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, 
Nation 204). Thus, it is through the logic of Foucault’s governmentality that it can be seen that 
by defining the ‘boundaries’ of a society, Japan can more effectively (re)construct that notions 
of what constitutes being a kokumin. 
 
4.2 A Contest History of Nationalism  
While examining Shinzo Abe’s ideas on nationalism, it can be seen that they are highly 
contested and less inclusive than initially proposed, however some scholars still feel that 
Shinzo Abe’s attempts at redefining Japanese nationalism are misunderstood. Kevin Doak, a 
Professor at Georgetown University has been quoted in saying that he feels that Shinzo Abe 
wants to shift the focus away from the ‘bad’ nationalism of the wartime period and towards 
Abe’s new kokuminshugi (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). Doak states that 
this is the reason why Shinzo Abe does not use the word minzoku in his book ‘Towards a 
Beautiful Country’ but instead only uses kokumin (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-
Nationalism). Thus, Doak argues that Abe’s nationalism should not be seen as a negative 
concept.  
While Doak has published a work outlining the history of nationalism within Japan9, 
what is most troubling is his quite unique understanding of the role that minzokushugi had 
within Japanese history. Doak has stated that ‘Ethnic nationalism has appealed to the left in 
                                                
9 A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan 
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postwar Japan for many reasons, most importantly that it provides a socio-cultural identity that 
need not find expression in laws and political institutions […] But ethnic nationalism has also 
been positioned as “Asian nationalism” at least since the 1955 Bandung Conference; in contrast, 
civic nationalism has from its very beginning in modern Japan and throughout East Asia been 
seen as the favorite of pro-Western governments, Christian minorities and intellectuals thought 
to be tainted by Western ways of thinking’ (Japan Chair Platform: Shinzo Abe's Civic 
Nationalism). Doak goes on to state that minzokushugi was given a boost within Japan by the 
fall of the Japanese Empire and that in the last few decades kokuminshugi has be gaining 
traction within Japan (Japan Chair Platform: Shinzo Abe's Civic Nationalism). The issue that 
these statements present stem from Doak’s oversimplification of what minzokushugi is and 
how it was used. From the manner in which Doak refers to minzokushugi it seems that he 
equates minzokushugi to ‘ethnic purity’, instead of this complex string of theories and 
narratives that have been used to construct Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’.  
Another issue that is presented by Doak’s understanding of minzokushugi is that he 
paints Japanese nationalism into too much of a black and white issue. An example of this can 
be seen in his statement that minzokushugi can be equated to ‘Asian nationalism’ and 
kokuminshugi can be equated to ‘Western’ nationalism (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-
Nationalism). Such an approach is problematic as Doak generalizes something as complex as 
nationalism into a regional variety such as ‘Asian nationalism’ and then expects this term to be 
able to explain the nationalistic trends in a region with such a diverse historical, social and 
cultural background. A second problem with Doak’s understanding is best summed up by 
Morris Suzuki where she states, ‘it assumes that the phenomenon of nationalism can be neatly 
separated into an “ethnic” and a “civic” variant, with the second being morally superior to the 
first […] the notions of race, culture, tradition and citizenship bound up in nationalism are far 
too complex to be captured in this easy formula (Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). It is Doak’s 
focus on the moral superiority between minzokushugi and kokuminshugi that inevitably 
presents this slanted understanding of how minzokushugi was used defining Japan’s 
Japaneseness.  
Morris-Suzuki in her article ‘Re-branding Abe-nationalism’ went on to make a 
statement that is at the heart of what this chapter is explaining, that ‘Abe’s core goal inherited 
from Kishi, clearly set out in Towards a Beautiful Country, and echoed in the manifestos of 
groups like the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership, is to “escape from the postwar 
regime”’ (nautilus.org). However, I would argue that Abe is trying to escape more than just the 
postwar regime through his proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism, but that he is also 
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trying to escape the effects of Japan’s colonial history as well. The reason why Abe is trying 
to escape the colonial and post war narratives is because that ‘the nationalized memories of the 
war are intricately enmeshed in narratives of decolonization and liberation’ (Fujitani, White 
and Yoneyama , Perilous memories: The Asia-pacific war(s) 9). However, for Japan these 
memories of decolonization and liberation do not inspire nationalistic pride nor unity like it did 
in Korea or Taiwan, but instead brought about national shame. Thus, Shinzo Abe’s proposed 
shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism shows the logic of Hymans’ reputation arrow 
where states must get history wrong to foster pride in the nation-state being used in order to 
escape Japan’s post-war national shame.  
 Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift in how Japan should define its nationalism can be viewed 
from many different perspectives. First there is the more obvious economic incentive of having 
a more inclusive form of nationalism in that Japan, as this will allow Japan to deal with it 
declining economic production by attracting foreign labour instead of relying on its declining 
population. However, when Shinzo Abe’s redefinition is more closely examined in regard to 
Shinzo Abe’s nationalistic views, this redefinition can be seen as Abe’s attempt to separate 
Japan from consequences of its imperial past. Thus, Abe’s attempts at making nationalism 
more about being a kokumin instead of being about of one minzoku can be seen as the 
contemporary form of changing the boundaries of Japan’s Japaneseness in order to achieve 
Abe’s political and economic incentives. But when the current kokumin status of the Zainichi 
Koreans is considered, Abe’s form of kokuminshugi seems less to have to do with being more 
inclusive and more to do with removing national guilt about colonial atrocities from Japan’s 
collective national identity.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
 In 2006, Shinzo Abe’s book utsukushii kuni e or ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ 
introduced the world to both Abe’s personal views through his anecdotes about his up-bringing. 
More importantly it also presented his political views and his ideas of nationalism. Abe’s ideas 
of not only how to help Japan’s stagnating economy but also how to solve Japan’s demographic 
issues presented Abe with the ideal situation to showcase his redefinition of Japan’s form of 
nationalism. The redefining of Japan’s nationalism from minzokushugi to that of kokuminshugi 
is seen as an attempt to open up Japan’s definition of Japaneseness that would spur further 
immigration. However, when Abe’s actions of redefining who is included and excluded in 
Japan’s Japaneseness is viewed from a historical perspective, a trend of Japan constantly 
changing the boundaries of Japaneseness is revealed.  
In the second chapter, the theoretical framework in which Japan justified shifting the 
boundaries of their Japaneseness was explained. It was shown that at the heart of Japan’s 
memory politics was Foucault’s concept of governmentality. The logic of governmentality 
showed that Japan’s memory politics was changed at various different points to more 
efficiently aid in the creation of Japanese ‘citizens’, be these individuals from Korea or the 
interior. This concept of governmentality was then expanded by examining why Japan engaged 
in memory politics by examining Takeo David Hymans’ theory of ‘the politics of memory’. 
Takeo David Hymans’ fluid and complex theory explains that nation-states engage in memory 
politics for the purpose of ‘gain’, ‘safety’ and/ or ‘reputation’.  
In the case of Japan, their ‘politics of memory’ was on full display when Japan’s 
conceptualization of what constitutes Japaneseness through the transition between the 
Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation theory and then the National Polity theory is 
examined. The concepts of gain, safety and reputation in relation to why Japan transitioned 
between these different frameworks shows that the conceptualization of Japan under 
frameworks such as the National Polity theory did not justify the colonial ambitions that the 
Japanese Empire had. Thus, to justify these ambitions without having to change this family-
state discourse, a new form of the National Polity theory mixed with the Mixed Nation theory 
shifted the boundaries of Japaneseness to allow Japan to engage in its colonial ambitions.  
In the third chapter, the theory of memory politics was shown not only to have 
influenced the historical memories between itself and other neighboring nations such as Korea 
and Taiwan, but that Japan’s memory politics is still distorting the contemporary 
conceptualization of Japan today. This was shown through how Japan incorporated and 
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assimilated both Hokkaido and Okinawa into the very fabric of what constitutes Japan. 
However, even this was a contested transition, with the Ryukyu domain and Yezo being viewed 
as foreign entities and part of the Japanese exterior. However, once these islands were taken in 
as provinces, the ‘prerogative to get history wrong’ narrative explained by Hymans’ reputation 
concept began to take prominence. This distortion of history and the conceptualization of what 
constitutes Japaneseness could be seen in how teachers such as Nitta Yoshitaka stated that the 
Ryukyu Islands were separate entities from Okinawa. This creates a problematic framework 
that Okinawa was merely locked in a temporal and spatial deficit in relation to the ‘interior’ 
but the mere action of separating these two terms created the false understanding Japan’s 
historical progression.  
The fourth chapter brought this historical perspective forth into a contemporary 
conclusion by examining how Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift in how nationalism should be 
defined was an extension of (re)defining Japaneseness to achieve the political and social 
agendas of the time. This redefinition, when viewed through the previously described economic 
and social issues followed the same pragmatic understanding of Japan’s Japaneseness. 
However, the case of the Zainichi Korean population showed the problems with memory 
politics and problems that arise with this shift towards kokuminshugi. While the concept of 
kokuminshugi itself presents a positive ambition of seeing a society that is not determined by 
ethnicity or blood lineage and more by an individual’s relation to the state, the context in which 
this redefinition is proposed presents an issue.  
While the first generation of the Zainichi population can be seen as being a legacy of 
Japan’s colonial behavior, the second and especially the third generation present an initially 
different dichotomy to the understanding of Japaneseness. As almost all third-generation 
Zainichi were born in Japan, speak Japanese, have Japanese friends and have almost no 
relationship with the ‘homeland’ of Korea, an important question is raised of if one is born in 
Japan, speaks Japanese, understands the social and cultural norms and values of Japan but still 
do not belong under the term kokumin, who does? This complex and multilayered issue 
presents to some extent the issues with a state sponsored form of nationalism in that it creates 
the in and out groups based on political agendas and objectives.  
Although scholars such as Kevin Doak argue that Shinzo Abe’s redefinition of 
nationalism is ‘misunderstood’, this thesis must agree with Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s analysis of 
Kevin Doak’s argument, namely that it is impossible to separate something as complex as 
nationalism in to neat categories of either ethnic or civic nationalism. By doing so, Doak creates 
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a false dichotomy where one is presented as a more moral form of nationalism and the other a 
more ‘Asian’ form.  
When considering the question ‘How does examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift 
towards kokuminshugi through the concept of ‘Japaneseness’ breakdown the continued 
influence of memory politics on the inclusion/exclusion debate within Japan?’ and who is 
included as a part of the nation-state, it can be seen that there is indeed a historical trend of 
pragmatisms in how Japan’s Japaneseness has been defined and quantified, leading to the 
inclusion or exclusion of a group of people based on the political motives of the time.  
The contemporary example of Japan’s Japaneseness being (re)defined shows that 
Shinzo Abe is not only advocating kokumin for the economic gain of more foriegn labourers, 
but that he is also attempting to escape the Japan colonial history and the post-war 
consequences of these actions. However, it seems that by attempting to redefine the boundaries 
of the Japanese nation-state, Abe raises such questions as ‘who is already included, who should 
be included and who can decide these boundaries?’. The exclusion of the zainichi population 
from the term kokumin is the literal representation of these internalized questions.  
In conclusion, when actions such as Abe’s proposed redefinition of nationalism are 
being examined it’s important not to just place them within their contemporary context but also 
to look at the historical placement of these actions in order to better understand why these 
actions are taking place. But, the constant redefinition of Japan’s Japaneseness creates the 
situation where the existences of these minorities (Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, etc.) 
become distorted in the imagined history of the Japanese nation-state and are blurred into a 
singular ethnography.   
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